Blackmon Broke Terms Of $400k Severance Contract; Payment Could Be Revoked
Last month, former police chief Freddie Blackmon signed a very generous $400,000 severance contract that he wasn't entitled to, offered by the City of Columbus. Now, Blackmon appears to have willingly and openly violated the terms of that contract in several different ways. Explore the full story to see how his several breaches of contract could result in losing his pay and benefits.
An artistic expression of Columbus, Georgia’s former police chief, Freddie Blackmon, superimposed on a colorized image of city officials commending his 37 years of service to the city during a special-call meeting on April 6, 2023. Now, Blackmon appears to have willingly broken several terms of his severance agreement which could result in the loss of his $400k pay and benefits.
Image Credit:
Muscogee Muckraker

Residents may voice their concerns regarding the several apparent breaches of contract by a former city officer by emailing Mayor Skip Henderson directly at SkipHenderson@columbusga.org, while cc’ing their respective city council members on the email.

COLUMBUS, Ga. — Former police chief Freddie Blackmon appears to have willingly and intentionally violated the terms of his $400,000 severance contract with the City of Columbus.

Now, that huge payout and all of its other benefits may be in jeopardy.

We recently published a recap of some of the terms and conditions of Blackmon’s severance agreement. One of those terms was that Blackmon must comply with all of the terms outlined in the contract.

Here’s a look at how former police chief Freddie Blackmon’s several breaches of his severance contract could result in the loss of his entire payout and all of his benefits, along with both the full memorandum published by Blackmon and his severance contract at the end of the article.

NO OBLIGATION

According to Section 3 of Blackmon’s severance contract:

“Employee further agrees and understands that Employee’s entitlement to the consideration set forth in Section 2 (his payments and benefits) is conditioned upon Employee’s execution and non-revocation of this Agreement and upon his compliance with the terms and conditions of this Agreement.”

What this means is that if Blackmon violates any of the terms of his agreement with CCG, he is no longer entitled to his payout nor his benefits; they are conditioned upon his compliance with the terms.

Additionally, the same section continues to state:

“Employee agrees that the consideration described above is over and above what he would be entitled to in the separation of his employment … ”

This means that had Blackmon been involuntarily terminated instead of agreeing to the severance contract, he wouldn’t have been entitled to just about anything the severance offered.

VIOLATION OF SECTION 7

By even having possession of the computer file required to type the memorandum Blackmon published on April 28, he had violated the terms of his severance agreement.

According to Section 7 of the contract:

“Employee represents and warrants that Employee has returned to CCG all property of CCG. Such property includes, but is not limited to, data, lists, information, memoranda, documents, identification cards, parking cards, keys, computers, fax machines, pagers, phones, files, and any and all written or descriptive material of any kind belonging or relating to CCG…”

Given that the memorandum was typed on official department letterhead, and given that Section 7 states that Blackmon already claimed to have returned all memoranda, documents, computers, files, and any written or descriptive material of any kind belonging or relating to CCG, and given that the memorandum is dated and was published by Blackmon on April 28, 2023, we can therefore conclude that Blackmon knowingly violated Section 7 of the severance agreement. 

VIOLATION OF SECTION 1

Blackmon’s April 28 memo under department letterhead identified himself as the chief of police, despite his formal removal from duty on April 6, 2023. Blackmon had no authority to use that letterhead, identify himself as the chief of police, nor to publish it to the public.

According to Section 1 of Blackmon’s severance agreement:

“The Parties agree that Employee will retire from CCG, effective April 30, 2023. Employee acknowledges and agrees that CCG has notified Employee that he has been relieved of all duties as of April 6, 2023 and the Parties agree that employee has been placed on a paid administrative leave from April 6, 2023 through April 30, 2023.”

As of April 6, Blackmon no longer had any actionable authority as the chief of police; he could no longer issue orders or use official department letterhead. When Blackmon published that memorandum, he had no legal authority whatsoever to use department letterhead, nor to identify himself as the chief of police. This is the same reason why the department’s assistant chiefs have been required to have Mayor Henderson sign certain documents as the director of public safety, since Blackmon no longer had the authority to do so. 

Nonetheless, Blackmon violated Section 1 of his severance contract by publishing his memorandum under department letterhead on April 28, despite knowing he had no legal authority to do so and that it broke his contract’s terms.

SECTION 2(C)

Within the second paragraph of Blackmon’s final memorandum published on April 28, he stated the following:

“While I was not afforded the opportunity to implement the strategic plan (sic) based on recommendations from an independent consulting firm … ”

However, according to Section 2(c) of Blackmon’s severance agreement:

“CCG will classify Employee’s separation from service as a “retirement” and Employee may represent to third parties that Employee retired from Employee’s employment with CCG.”

By wording his statement as he did, Blackmon stated that he “wasn’t afforded the opportunity.” To not be afforded an opportunity, one must have had that opportunity removed. For Blackmon to openly state that he was not afforded the opportunity, he implies that CCG wrongfully removed it from him. That, of course, isn't true, as Section 2(c) clearly states that Blackmon’s separation was classified as a retirement.

By choosing to word his statement as such, Blackmon communicated to the public that he was somehow wrongfully terminated, even though he willingly chose to agree to his retirement as stated in Section 2(c). 

While the section does say the employee “may” represent to third parties that he retired, Blackmon’s specific choice to falsely imply that he involuntarily had the “opportunity” removed from him is clearly not in-line with the mutual intention of the Parties at the time of the agreement’s execution. 

We can also support this deduction with the language of the agreement’s non-disparagement clause, which Blackmon’s April 28 memo also violated.

VIOLATION OF SECTION 6(A)

Within Blackmon’s April 28 memo — which he did not have the legal authority to publish — Blackmon made several disparaging remarks about CCG.

According to Section 6(a) of Blackmon’s severance contract:

“Employee agrees that Employee will not make any negative, disparaging, or unflattering statements about CCG or any of the Releasees (CCG officials and employees) to any individual or entity …”

As discussed above, Blackmon’s assertion that he was “not afforded the opportunity” implies that said opportunity was wrongfully taken from him by CCG; there is simply no other way to interpret the clear language he chose to place into writing within the context of the entire scenario. Making such a statement is disparaging on its face.

Additionally, the third paragraph of Blackmon’s April 28 memo stated the following:

“I want to personally thank my supporters who showed up and spoke on my behalf in the face of adversity. While recent events sparked controversy, it’s (sic) important to understand that everything happens for a reason. What is even more important is for citizens to exercise their right to vote, especially in local elections. It is imperative that the leaders we elect have the best interest of those they represent at heart.”

By identifying a sub-group of the population as his so-called “supporters,” Blackmon chose to identify only one side of a political controversy as the subject of his paragraph: the side that wished for him to remain chief. In doing so, Blackmon by default also acknowledged there to be political opposition to his “supporters”; there would otherwise be no reason to specify them as such. 

That opposition, given the collective context of the memo and the scenario as a whole, is implied by Blackmon to be CCG. The disparaging statement serves to further show Blackmon’s general theme of disparagement through the memorandum. 

Blackmon then chose to encourage citizens to vote, especially in local elections. Again, context matters. Given that Blackmon has already twice disparaged CCG within this memorandum, the reasonable person would interpret his call to vote against the city’s current elected officials as an unflattering and disparaging remark against CCG. 

Blackmon then ended that same paragraph as follows, supporting his general theme of disparagement while using unusual and inconsistent text formatting to draw attention to the single sentence:

“It is imperative that the leaders we elect have the best interest of those they represent at heart.”

That final line, within the greater context of the paragraph, memorandum, and scenario as a whole, does in fact imply beyond any shadow of a doubt that Blackmon was in fact disparaging CCG by implying that the city’s elected officials do not have the “best interest of those they represent at heart.” Following the basic tenets of tort law, the “reasonable person” would agree.

The text formatting used on this one sentence is not present anywhere else in the entire document. It was clearly used with purpose by Blackmon to place special emphasis on it without overtly using bold or underlined text in hopes of maintaining plausible deniability. However, the formatting’s unique use there and only there within the document ironically denies that potential for plausible deniability; it was intentionally used to assert that this one line in particular was of special importance.

Given Blackmon’s continued use of disparaging and unflattering remarks throughout the April 28 memo — both made separately and as they come together jointly — it is clear that Blackmon intentionally violated the non-disparagement clause found in Section 6(a) of his severance agreement.

Furthermore, Blackmon’s poor attempt to use covert language in an attempt to hide and disguise his language shows a direct — yet poor — effort to knowingly attempt to skirt the boundaries of Section 6(a) while hoping to produce the same effect: disparagement. The language of Blackmon’s sentence structure is not the only factor at play. By attempting to conceal his intent while hoping to produce the same disparaging result, Blackmon also inadvertently revealed actual malice.

VIOLATION OF SECTION 4(A)

By making the disparaging remarks that he did, Blackmon implied assertions that he had been wronged by CCG. The disparaging remarks discussed above show that Blackmon was implying that he was not satisfied with CCG’s employment practices and how they affected his separation from employment.

According to Section 4(a), Blackmon agreed to waive and release “any and all claims, complaints, liabilities, obligations, promises, agreements, controversies, damages, actions, causes of action, suits, rights, demands, costs, losses, debts, and expenses of any nature whatsoever (be them known or unknown) which Employee ever had, may have, or now has against CCG … indirectly from Employee’s employment with CCG, the termination of Employee’s employment, any actions by CCG or any employee, officer, agent, or representative of CCG related to Employee’s employment, or any other events accrued or occurring before the Effective Date…”

The fact that the specific language of Section 4(a) itemizes both a claim and a cause of action as separate items dictates that the two terms were not intended by the Parties to be interpreted synonymously within the agreement.

Given that Blackmon presented his disparaging remarks as a set of operative facts that spoke to the creation of a right enforceable in court, Blackmon made claims that violate Section 4(a) of his severance agreement.

IN CONCLUSION

Given Blackmon’s several blatantly-apparent violations of the terms of his severance agreement, and given that his entitlement to the considerations therein are conditional upon his compliance with the terms of the agreement, we can therefore conclude that Blackmon may no longer be entitled to the $400,000 payout nor the other various benefits of his severance. 

Here’s Blackmon’s full statement below, followed by his signed, legally-binding, and fully-enforceable severance contract so you can form your own conclusion as the reader based on the evidence.

Residents may voice their concerns regarding the several apparent breaches of contract by a former city officer by emailing Mayor Skip Henderson directly at SkipHenderson@columbusga.org, while cc’ing their respective city council members on the email.

Facts are stubborn things — and we’ll keep publishing them, whether city officials like them or not.

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